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Abstract 
 
Over the past two decades conditionality has moved to the heart of the European 
Union’s (EU) foreign policy and is one of the key instruments of the enlargement 
policy. This paper looks into one specific aspect of the EU’s conditionality vis-à-vis the 
Republic of Serbia, namely the demand for cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This paper aims to assess the extent 
t o  w h i c h  t h e  E U ’ s  p o l i c y  o f  ‘ I C T Y  c o n d i t i o nality’ has been effective. By using the 
‘external incentives model’ as the main theoretical framework, and supplementing it 
with insights of scholars who have studied past enlargements, I will identify and 
evaluate the main factors determining the success of this specific case of 
conditionality. I will demonstrate that, at times, the EU has been effective in 
employing ‘ICTY conditionality’, but that this has not been consistently so. I argue 
that on the EU’s side, the uncertainty concerning eventual membership and the lack 
of consistency in applying conditionality are the main factors undermining the 
policy’s effectiveness. On the Serbian side, the great political costs entailed by 
cooperation, and the lack of political will to reform the structures of certain veto 
players are hindrances for a policy of full cooperation with the Tribunal. This paper 
shows that conditionality is indeed a two-way process and that effectiveness is as 
much determined by the setter of the condition as by the target state. Moreover, by 
viewing this case as part of the broader policy of conditionality the EU has set out for 
aspiring members, the analysis will pinpoint some of the changing dynamics in the 
enlargement policy and contribute to the existing literature in this field.  
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1. Introduction: Setting Conditions for Cooperation 
 
Over the past two decades conditionality has moved to the heart of the European 
Union’s foreign policy and has become the cardinal principle of the enlargement 
process.1 The use of conditionality in the relations with the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) which joined the EU in 2004 has been heralded as a 
great success and a demonstration of the EU’s transformative power.2 By setting out 
the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ as conditions for accession in 1993 and assisting the 
aspiring members to reach these conditions by concluding Europe Agreements, the 
Union has actively pursued economic and democratic reforms and stimulated 
lasting change in the CEECs.3 However, the cases of Bulgaria and Romania have 
tempered the euphoria of the effectiveness of enlargement conditionality. As one 
diplomat argued, “there is now a general feeling among most EU member states 
that they [Bulgaria and Romania] joined too soon and that conditionality should 
have been applied more strictly”. 4  By consequence, the EU’s approach to 
enlargement and conditionality is somewhat different with regard to the countries of 
the Western Balkans. Most authors agree that the underlying dynamics of enlarge-
ment have changed: the EU member states have been more cautious and reluctant 
in putting forward a membership perspective, and more conditions have been set 
out.5 In addition, the political situation in the Western Balkans is deemed more 
complex, reforms seem to go slower and the road towards future membership is still 
long for most of these countries.  
 
This paper aims to assess the effectiveness of one specific component of the Union’s 
current policy of conditionality, namely the obligation of full cooperation with the 
                                                 
1 C. Pippan, ‘The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process for the 
Western Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 9, 
no. 2, 2004, p. 220. 
2 H. Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 15-16. 
3 K.E. Smith, ‘The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’, in M. Cremona 
(ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 121-
122; European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, 180/1/93, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 
1993, pp. 12-13. These criteria include guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities; being a functioning market economy; and 
accepting the Community acquis. 
4 Interview with diplomat A, Brussels, 10 February 2009. 
5  R.A. Epstein & U. Sedelmeier, ‘Beyond Conditionality: International Institutions in Post-
communist Europe after Enlargement’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 6, 2008, 
p. 799; D. Phinnemore, ‘Beyond 25 – the Changing Face of EU Enlargement: Commitment, 
Conditionality and the Constitutional Treaty’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol. 
8, no. 1, 2006, p. 17; G. Pridham, ‘Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political 
Conditionality: Aims, Approach, and Priorities’, Democratization, vol. 14, no. 3, 2007, p. 454.  
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the case of Serbia. The 
reason for this particular case study is that it looks into a new form of conditionality 
which is being applied with regard to one of the most complex potential candidate 
members. Indeed, due to its turbulent past, the issue of Kosovo, its strong nationalism 
and utterly divided political landscape, Serbia is one of the toughest ‘potential 
candidates’ the EU has to deal with. The cooperation with the Tribunal in The Hague, 
and in particular the extradition of suspected war criminals, is one of the most 
controversial and politically sensitive topics in Serbian politics. Since the Court’s 
establishment in 1993, cooperation has been put on the Serbian agenda by the West 
and demands in this respect have intensified since the Kosovo war of 1999. Currently, 
it is the only condition left for ratification of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement between Serbia and the EU and arguably one of the few remaining 
obstacles on Serbia’s path to become an actual candidate.  
 
The effectiveness of ‘ICTY conditionality’ is a topic which has not yet received much 
academic attention; nevertheless it is highly relevant for three reasons: First of all, this 
case study will build on the existing literature on enlargement and give a more 
precise idea of the new dynamics in this field. Secondly, the findings of this paper will 
qualify scholars’ statements that conditionality has become more elaborate and 
stringent for aspiring members as compared to the conditions the CEECs had to fulfil. 
Thirdly, an assessment of the effectiveness of ‘ICTY conditionality’ will tell us 
something more about the transformative power of the EU with regard to a new 
group of target states. As explained above, Serbia is a tough partner for the EU, but if 
the Union’s conditionality of cooperation with the ICTY is successful, it will once again 
have pushed the boundaries of its ability to influence reforms and stimulate change 
in potential member states. 
  
Anastasakis and Bechev define conditionality as a one-way process, whereby the EU 
sets out conditions which have to be accepted and fulfilled unconditionally by the 
target states.6 Meeting the conditions usually means the country in question can 
integrate more with the EU. The prospect of moving closer to Europe or eventual 
accession to the Union should serve as an external incentive for internal reforms. A 
theoretical framework based on the ‘external incentives model’ as defined by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier will provide the necessary hypotheses to produce a 
                                                 
6 O. Anastasakis & D. Bechev, ‘EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment 
to the Process’, South East European Studies Programme, April 2003, retrieved 24 March 2009, 
http://www.cespi.it/STOCCHIERO/dossierBalcani/conditionality.PDF, p. 13. 
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comprehensive understanding of the application of ‘ICTY conditionality’.7 In order to 
measure the effectiveness of the conditionality, I will be looking at the degree to 
which the objectives set out by the EU are achieved. However, assessing the 
effectiveness of conditionality is a complex issue as the targeted performance 
against which the actual performance is to be measured is often unclear. The 
problems surrounding the concept of effectiveness in this particular case are treated 
more elaborately in the thesis on which this paper is based.8 
 
The paper is divided into two parts: In the first part I will look at ‘ICTY conditionality’ 
from an EU perspective. Here, I will analyse the evolution of ‘ICTY conditionality’ in 
the EU’s relations with Serbia and address the deficiencies in the application of it. I 
argue that the lack of a clear prospect of accession and the inconsistency in 
applying the condition are the main shortcomings in this policy. The second part of 
the case study will focus on ‘ICTY conditionality’ from the Serbian point of view. 
Although cooperation with the ICTY has been demanded by the EU since the 
establishment of the Tribunal, I will only analyse the period since 5 October 2000. This 
date marked the end of the Milošević era, the beginning of the democratic 
transition in Serbia and the end of a decade of wars in the region. It is also the 
starting point of intensified advocacy of the West and the EU in particular to bolster 
democracy and stimulate political and economic reforms in Serbia. The ousting of 
Milošević and his 1999 ICTY indictment also marked the beginning of more pressure 
on the Serbian authorities to cooperate fully with the Tribunal in The Hague.9 I will 
demonstrate that ‘ICTY conditionality’ is not strictly a one way process, but to a large 
extent its effectiveness is influenced by those in power in the target state.  
 
The sources used to analyse this case study range from official reports and 
documents of the EU, international organisations and the Serbian government, to 
briefings of international and Serbian non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The 
Commission’s progress reports on Serbia and the yearly addresses of the ICTY’s Chief 
Prosecutor before the UN Security Council will serve as the basis for assessing Serbia’s 
cooperation with the Tribunal. Reference to reports from institutions such as the 
International Crisis Group and human rights NGOs will facilitate a more nuanced 
                                                 
7 F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier, ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 
11, no. 4, 2004 pp. 661-679. 
8 See M. Dobbels, Serbia & the ICTY: an Analysis of EU Conditionality, Master’s thesis, Bruges, 
College of Europe, 2009, pp. 16-19. 
9 V. Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for 
State Cooperation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 61. 
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critique of the official reports and assess the effectiveness of conditionality. In order 
to have a broader view of the impact of ‘ICTY conditionality’ on Serbian society, 
opinion polls will be used to analyse evolutions in the public’s attitude towards the 
Tribunal. For more recent developments in Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, I have 
relied on press reports and in-depth interviews with officials from several EU member 
states, Serbian diplomats and representatives from civil society in Belgrade.  
 
2. ‘ICTY Conditionality’ from the EU’s Point of View 
 
2.1 Which ‘Carrot’? 
According to the ‘external incentives model’, it can be hypothesized that the 
effectiveness of ‘ICTY conditionality’ will increase with the size and temporal 
proximity of the promised rewards.10 Frank Schimmelfennig adds that “nothing short 
of a credible conditional accession perspective has proven effective” and that 
“material incentives below the threshold of EU membership – such as financial aid or 
association agreements – are too weak”.11 Although calls for cooperation by the EU 
date back to the Tribunal’s establishment in 1993, they were not tied to any concrete 
rewards until 2005. Moreover, it is interesting to see that the Union has been very 
reluctant to put forward a clear membership perspective in its relations with Serbia. A 
stance which – according to this perspective – could seriously hamper the 
effectiveness of conditionality. 
 
2.1.1 The Ultimate Goal of EU Membership 
In 1997 the EU launched the ‘Regional Approach’ with the aim of promoting regional 
cooperation, stability and economic recovery in the states of the former 
Yugoslavia.12 In the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 29 April 1997, 
cooperation with the Tribunal is mentioned as one of the conditions for obtaining 
‘contractual relations’ with the Union.13 However, the member states did not mention 
what such ‘contractual relations’ entailed and clearly avoided putting forward a 
distinct membership perspective for the countries in the region.14 It was not until after 
the Kosovo war in 1999 that the Union defined this relationship. When the Stabilisation 
                                                 
10  Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, op.cit., p. 666; F. Schimmelfennig, ‘EU Political Accession 
Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 6, 2008, p. 920. 
11 Schimmelfennig, op.cit., p. 920. 
12 Anastasakis & Bechev, op.cit., p. 7. 
13 General Affairs Council, Conclusions on the Former Yugoslavia, Brussels, 29 April 1997. 
14  D. Phinnemore, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the 
Western Balkans?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 8, no. 1, 2003, p. 98. 
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and Association Process (SAP) was launched, the EU reiterated the conditions of April 
1997 and tied them to the negotiation and conclusion of a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA).15 The benefits of an SAA include “asymmetric trade 
liberalisation, economic and financial assistance […], assistance for democratisation 
and civil society, […] cooperation in justice and home affairs and the development 
of a political dialogue”.16 If the Commission judges that Serbia sufficiently fulfils the 
political and economic conditions set out by the Union, it will draft a formal proposal 
for negotiation directives. Consequently, on the Council’s approval, it will start 
negotiations with the Serbian government.17 The SAP marked the end of an era of 
sanctioning in the region and the beginning of the use of positive conditionality to 
promote stability by bringing the countries of the Western Balkans closer to the EU.18 
But what is the reward tied to compliance with the conditions? Is it eventual 
membership or something less attractive? 
 
The SAAs were presented by the Commission as the successors of the Europe 
Agreements, which were concluded with the Central and Eastern European 
countries. However, they are less ambitious in terms of the envisaged association. 
Once again the Commission clearly refrained from referring to a membership 
perspective and instead described the purpose of the SAAs as “drawing the region 
closer to the perspective of full integration into EU structures”.19 A year later, the 
European Council created a new status as it labelled the SAP countries ‘potential 
candidates’.20 While this may seem a great step forward in granting states like Serbia 
a membership perspective, the commitment remains political and does not imply 
any legal rights. Moreover, when analysing the recitals of the first two SAAs 
(concluded with Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), the lack 
of commitment on the part of the EU is remarkable. The strong engagement which 
the member states took in the Europe Agreements to actively contribute to the 
achievement of membership is absent in the SAAs. 21 However, the Thessaloniki 
Declaration of June 2003 marked a turn in the reluctant stance of the Union. The 
European Council declared that “the future of the Balkans is within the EU” and 
committed itself to actively support integration of the Western Balkans states with the 
                                                 
15 The main conditions are: commitment to carry out democratic and market reforms, respect 
for human rights, return of refugees, commitment to a process of regional cooperation and 
cooperation with the ICTY. 
16 Anastasakis & Bechev, op.cit. 
17 Pippan, op.cit., p. 234. 
18 Ibid., p. 235. 
19 Phinnemore, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements’, op.cit., p. 99. 
20 Phinnemore, ‘Beyond 25 – the Changing Face of EU Enlargement’, op.cit., p. 12. 
21 Phinnemore, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements’, op.cit., p. 100. 
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EU.22 Moreover, by introducing ‘European Partnerships’ as an additional accession 
instrument of the SAP and granting candidacy status to Croatia in 2004, the 
membership perspective for countries from the Western Balkans appeared to be a 
lot clearer.23 In addition to that, the SAP portfolio was moved to DG Enlargement in 
2005, and FYROM too, was given candidacy status.24  
 
Nevertheless, there still seems to be some reluctance on part of the EU member 
states to actively pursue enlargement for the countries of the Western Balkans. 
Negotiations with FYROM have yet to start, the candidacy applications of 
Montenegro and Albania are still pending and the same fate will arguably fall to the 
future application of Serbia. Moreover, as one diplomat argued, “the last thing we 
want to do now is project dates for candidacy or accession of these states. We have 
become very prudent and won’t be letting any countries in quickly. The goal of 
membership is a long-term goal and conditions need to be fulfilled before 
membership will be considered”.25 There is a membership perspective for Serbia, but 
it is long-term and should not be taken for granted.  
 
2.1.2 The ‘SAA Carrot’ 
Up until 2005 the condition of cooperation with the ICTY was not tied to any specific 
reward. After the fall of Milošević in 2001, there was a general reluctance in the EU to 
make the relations with Serbia dependent on cooperation with the ICTY.26 It was 
mentioned as one of the conditions in the SAP, but the EU never explicitly linked the 
SAA to the fulfilment of the ‘ICTY condition’. According to Carla del Ponte – Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICTY from 1999 to 2008 – the only external actor which had an 
impact on Serbia’s cooperation before 2005 were the United States. 27 The US 
government and the House of Representatives have a yearly ‘certification 
procedure’ for aid and assistance to Serbia. This certification is conditioned upon the 
cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY and every year since the fall of Milošević, 
cooperation increased remarkably when the deadline drew near.28 Nevertheless, it is 
remarkable to note that on one instance before 2005, cooperation increased visibly 
when the US deadline had already passed. Between the end of May and the 
                                                 
22 Council of the European Union, EU-Western Balkans Summit – Declaration, 10229/03 (Presse 
163), Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, p. 1. 
23 Phinnemore, ‘And not Forgetting the Rest’, op.cit., p. 16. 
24  E.T. Fakiolas & N. Tzifakis, ‘Transformation or Accession? Reflecting on the EU’s Strategy 
towards the Western Balkans’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 13, no. 3, 2008, p. 389. 
25 Interview with diplomat C, The Hague, 9 February 2009. 
26 C. del Ponte, Mevrouw de aanklager, Amsterdam, De Bezige Bij, 2008, p. 152. 
27 Ibid., pp. 152-153. 
28 Ibid., pp. 155, 163, 221-223. 
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beginning of July 2003 Serbia arrested five suspects and extradited them to The 
Hague. This was exactly around the time the EU held its Western Balkans summit in 
Thessaloniki, pronouncing a clearer membership perspective and reiterating the 
need of cooperation with the ICTY as one of the key conditions for further 
integration.29 
 
However, it was not until 2005 that the ‘SAA carrot’ of the European Union started 
having an effect on Serbia. The reason for this timing is threefold. It was the first time 
that Commissioner Olli Rehn had explicitly linked the start of SAA negotiations to 
Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY.  30 It was also right after the two first SAAs had 
been implemented by Croatia and FYROM, and there was a sense within the Serbian 
government that they could not stay behind. And last but not least, it was the year in 
which Croatia started its accession negotiations, confirming the membership 
perspective for the countries of the Western Balkans. The effect was remarkable: 
cooperation increased dramatically and according to Carla del Ponte, the EU’s 
pressure had contributed to the surrender and arrest of no fewer than 14 suspects.31 
A second example of the EU’s effectiveness in pressuring Serbia to cooperate with 
the ICTY was the arrest and extradition of Radovan Karadžić in July 2008. This too has 
largely contributed to the EU’s stance of tying the ratification of the SAA to Serbia’s 
cooperation with the ICTY.32  
 
Coming back to the hypothesis formulated at the beginning of this section, it could 
be argued that it has stood the test, since conditionality was effective once it was 
tied to immediate rewards (e.g. start of negotiations on SAA in 2005 and the entry 
into force of the SAA in 2008), and once it had become clear that the SAA was 
indeed the first step towards future accession to the Union. Contrary to what 
Schimmelfennig argues, the promise of membership can still be fairly distant and 
does not need to be the immediate reward for compliance to be stimulated. ‘ICTY 
conditionality’ can thus be effective if the overall incentive is considered big enough 
and the concrete reward immediate. However, even after 2005 and with the 
prospect of an SAA, compliance has not always been consistent. This is due to the 
impact of other factors in the relations between Serbia and the EU, which will be 
discussed below. 
 
                                                 
29 Pippan, op.cit., p. 241. 
30 Del Ponte, op.cit., p. 455. 
31 Ibid., pp. 455-459. 
32 E. Vucheva, ‘Dutch Stance on Serbia “Very Unfair”, Says Minister’, Euractiv, 17 September 
2008. 
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2.2 Credibility: a Question of Capacity and Consistency 
Effectiveness of conditionality is in part determined by the credibility of the external 
actor who sets the conditions. Credibility in turn depends on the capacity of the 
actor to deliver its promised reward and the consistency with which the condition-
ality is employed.33 This section will be divided in two parts, in which I will address 
these two sub-factors and determine to what extent they have limited the 
effectiveness of ‘ICTY conditionality’. 
 
2.2.1 Capacity to Deliver 
According to the ‘external incentives model’, the less capable the EU is to fulfil its 
promises, the less credible and therefore the less effective the application of ‘ICTY 
conditionality’ will be.34 As I have already demonstrated above, this case study 
needs to be seen in the context of enlargement. After all, the Union’s conditionality 
for Serbia only started having effect after the membership perspective was made 
clearer at the Thessaloniki summit in 2003. Nevertheless, the overall ‘carrot’ of 
membership should not be taken for granted in terms of delivery. As Phinnemore 
argues, “accession to the EU is becoming increasingly more difficult. Hence there is 
greater uncertainty about when – and indeed possibly whether – further enlarge-
ment will take place”.35 A few factors have indeed complicated the dynamics of the 
enlargement policy with regard to the Western Balkans. First of all, there is the issue of 
the language surrounding enlargement. The EU seems to be more reluctant to 
committ itself firmly to membership in general, avoiding a clear engagement.36 
Secondly, both the institutions of the EU and important member states such as 
France and Germany are more cautious and sometimes even hostile with regard to 
future enlargement as they are calling for “slowing down […] accession business”.37 
In addition to that, some countries – such as France and Austria – are now 
considering the option to put future enlargements to a referendum.38 This would 
constitute an additional hurdle in the accession process, as public opinion – 
especially in the older member states – seems to be unsupportive of future 
enlargement.39 H o w e v e r ,  i t  m u s t  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  many of the reservations vis-à-vis 
enlargement relate to the question of Turkish membership. Nevertheless, they give 
rise to the impression of a deeply entrenched feeling of ‘enlargement fatigue’. 
                                                 
33 Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, op.cit., p. 665. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Phinnemore, ‘Beyond 25 – the Changing Face of EU Enlargement’, op.cit., p. 8. 
36 Ibid., p. 9. 
37 Pridham, op.cit., p. 465. 
38 Schimmelfennig, op.cit., p. 919. 
39 Fakiolas & Tzifakis, op.cit., p. 395. 
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The current enlargement dynamics have also been influenced by the debate on the 
‘absorption capacity’ or ‘integration capacity’ of the EU. This idea is as old as the 
process of enlargement but really came into the picture in 1993, when the EU stated 
that “[t]he Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the 
general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries”.40 The member 
states reaffirmed this position in 2006 by stating that “the pace of enlargement must 
take the Union’s absorption capacity into account”.41 These statements became all 
the more topical when the Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty in a 2008 referendum. This 
not only had a profound effect on the EU’s internal dynamics, but also on the 
enlargement policy as both President Sarkozy of France and Chancellor Merkel of 
Germany stated that no further enlargement could take place without the Lisbon 
Treaty being ratified.42 
 
All elements considered, the conclusion is that ‘enlargement’ has become a 
contentious issue and that there are doubts on the Union’s capacity to deliver the 
eventual reward of membership. This undoubtedly will have its impact on the 
effectiveness of ‘ICTY conditionality’, as this hurdle is part of a process leading to EU 
membership. It is the aim of Serbian leaders to accede in 2014, but with the current 
hesitance and reluctance surrounding enlargement this might be too optimistic.43 If 
the credibility of the overall reward of membership is further reduced, it will become 
more difficult to motivate Serbia to comply with the conditions.  
 
2.2.2 Consistency 
Karen Smith argues that if conditionality is not applied consistently, it will diminish in 
force and effectiveness.44 Consistency needs to be guaranteed on three levels: 
internally, over time and in different cases. In order for the EU to be consistent 
internally, member states and institutions need to ‘sing from the same song sheet’. 
Pridham notes that since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC) and the European Parliament have become 
                                                 
40 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, 180/1/93, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, 
p. 12. 
41 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, 10633/1/06, Brussels, 17 July 2006, p. 19. 
42 ‘Sarkozy and Merkel Rule out Enlargement without Lisbon’, Euro Intelligence, 20 June 2008, 
retrieved 10 April 2009, http://www.eurointelligence.com/Article3.1018+M5895ad6ee9f.0.html 
43 Serbian European Integration Office, Djelic: If We Are Efficient, We Might Join EU in Four to 
Six Years, Belgrade, SEIO, 15 July 2008. 
44 Smith, op.cit., p. 105. 
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more involved in enlargement policy.45 This evolution has created more discord 
within the EU. While the Parliament and some member states argue for a tougher 
approach on conditionality, others in the Council advocate a more lenient stance. 
Much of the opposition is case-specific, but these divisions have made it more 
difficult to operationalise conditionality. One example of this is the disagreement on 
how to assess compliance with the ‘ICTY condition’. According to one diplomat, 
there are two distinct camps in the Council when it comes to the policy of 
conditionality vis-à-vis Serbia: there are the member states who advocate a strict 
policy of conditionality, in order to avoid a repeat of the ‘mistakes’ of the 2007 
enlargement; and there are those who believe the EU’s policy of conditionality 
would be more effective if it involved giving significant intermediate rewards to 
Serbia to show that its path to the EU is a credible one.46  
 
The main protagonists in the former camp are the Netherlands and Belgium, while 
the latter camp consists of Slovenia, Spain, Italy, Greece, France and Sweden, which 
has switched camps under Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt.47 In her memoires, 
Carla del Ponte seems to confirm this division, arguing that France under Chirac and 
with Hubert Védrine as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sweden under Carl Bildt, 
repeatedly argued that strict conditionality would destabilise Serbia and that a softer 
stance would be far more effective.48 Several instances have been recorded when 
the divide within Europe on the policy of conditionality vis-à-vis Serbia has led to 
enormous tensions. The two most important incidents were both related to the 
negotiation and conclusion of the SAA with Serbia. When in 2006, the Commission 
and the Netherlands called for a suspension of negotiations because of a lack of 
cooperation, Germany blocked this suspension, causing Olli Rehn to postpone the 
deadline that was set for Serbia.49 According to del Ponte, this was a show of 
weakness on the part of the EU.50 As a result, the suspension which followed a couple 
of months later did not have a strong impact on Serbia’s record of cooperation as 
the Serbian government realised that it could exploit the divisions within Europe and 
push for a resumption of the negotiations. The other incident came at the end of 
2007 when Greece, Spain and Germany wanted to sign the SAA in order to boost 
the chances of Boris Tadić in the presidential elections of January 2008. While the 
Netherlands and Belgium argued that the Union should hold on to its conditionality, 
                                                 
45 Pridham, op.cit., p. 455. 
46 Interview with diplomat A, op.cit. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Del Ponte, op.cit., pp. 140, 151, 167-168. 
49 Pridham, op.cit., p. 466. 
50 Del Ponte, op.cit., pp. 465-467. 
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Olli Rehn was pushed by the other members to ‘initial’ the text – the first step of the 
ratification procedure.51 When after the elections, the Dutch refused to proceed with 
the ratification of the SAA, the Serbs branded this move as ‘unfair’, especially in the 
light of the recent arrest of Radovan Karadžić.52 It is clear from this short analysis that 
the Union struggles to act and speak ‘with one voice’. The lack of consistency in 
applying conditionality leaves scope for misinterpretation and manipulation on the 
Serbian part, which in turn undermines the effectiveness of conditionality. This issue 
will be dealt with in the next chapter where Serbia’s track record of cooperation with 
the Tribunal will be analysed. 
 
Regarding the consistency over time, I already noted the difference between the 
policy of the Union before and after 2005, as there was no clear or strong link 
between the condition of cooperation with the ICTY and any concrete reward up 
until 2005. But even after 2005, the EU did not always consistently pursue a policy of 
strong conditionality. The two incidents discussed above not only tell us something 
about the internal consistency of the Union, but also about the consistency over 
time. When it became clear that Serbia was not keeping its promise to arrest Ratko 
Mladić before an EU-set deadline, there was a general consensus within the GAERC 
to suspend negotiations in May 2006.53 However, the unified position of the member 
states soon began to show cracks as the negotiations on the final status of Kosovo, 
led by UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari, drew to an end in mid-2007. Carla del Ponte 
recalls that some member states – under the leadership of Italy and Greece – started 
to plead for a resumption of the negotiations to appease Belgrade on the Kosovo 
issue.54 Moreover, after the Americans had softened their stance on ‘ICTY coopera-
tion’ and given the Serbs the prospect of joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
programme, pressure mounted on the EU to soften its policy of conditionality as well.  
 
Austria, Hungary, France and Greece finally launched the proposal to resume the 
negotiations with Serbia.55 Javier Solana, who temporarily took over from Olli Rehn, 
contended that it was difficult to keep the issue of ‘ICTY cooperation’ separate from 
the Kosovo issue, as the two cases were handled by the same Serbian government.56 
According to one diplomat, there was a general fear that Serbia would lapse into 
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the Russian sphere of influence, if the EU pursued a policy of strict conditionality 
against the backdrop of negotiations on Kosovo.57 Again the argument was made 
that “with an aggressive and hostile EU stance, cooperation would not be 
enhanced, nationalist sentiments would be fostered and the region would run the risk 
of being destabilized”.58 Finally, even the most ardent advocates of ICTY coopera-
tion were forced to back down. The EU resumed the talks with Serbia in June 2007, 
officially because “[a]fter months of stalemate in Serbia’s cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Serbian authorities 
made progress […] which enabled the Commission to resume the SAA negotiations 
on 13 June 2007”.59 In reality, this meant a serious compromise as “the EU reneged on 
the condition [of Mladić’s arrest] it had established a year earlier when it suspended 
negotiations”.60 
 
As explained above, in the second incident, the Commission – under pressure from 
Germany, Greece and Spain – signed the SAA, in order to boost Tadić’s chances in 
the presidential elections of 2008. This was all the more remarkable because the 2007 
progress report of the Commission stated that the signing of the SAA was 
conditioned upon Serbia’s full cooperation, and the ICTY report of 2007 clearly said 
that “cooperation did not reach the point of being full and consistent”.61 Here too, 
the conclusion is that the EU does not apply ‘ICTY conditionality’ in a consistent way. 
By softening the European stance on cooperation with the Tribunal for political 
reasons, the EU sends out an image that its position is relative and that compromises 
can be made. This constitutes serious damage to the credibility of conditionality and 
undermines its effectiveness. 
 
Finally, on consistency in different cases, the obvious case to study is Croatia. Croatia 
concluded its SAA, implemented it and started accession negotiations in 2005. 
According to the Serbs, this is unfair, as one of the main Croat fugitives and indictees, 
Ante Gotovina, was still at large when accession negotiations started.62 The EU 
Council of Ministers had postponed the planned opening of accession negotiations 
in March 2005 because of Croatia’s failure to arrest and extradite Gotovina. While 
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the reports of ICTY on Croatia’s cooperation were still below par in September 2005, 
Carla del Ponte changed her stance in October 2005 declaring that Croatia was 
cooperating fully.63 Although it was never acknowledged publicly, it was clear that 
the issue of Croatia had become mixed up with the Turkey dossier. As Austria, a great 
supporter of Croatian membership, stood isolated in its opposition on opening 
accession negotiations with Turkey, a package deal was made. Austria “would get 
Croatia” if it gave up its opposition on Turkey.64 By putting pressure on del Ponte to 
soften her reports on Croatia’s cooperation, the Union would not lose face in 
opening negotiations with the Croatian government. A concurrence of political 
factors created a ‘window of opportunity’ for Croatia, but also undermined the EU’s 
credibility in holding on to a tough stance vis-à-vis Serbia as it gives the impression 
that conditionality is negotiable and variable from case to case. The example of 
Gotovina, also gives an extra argument to the advocates of a softer approach on 
conditionality, as the opening of accession negotiations did not permit Croatia to 
avoid its obligations. With the help of the Spanish government, Gotovina was 
arrested two months after the accession negotiations had started.65 
 
In conclusion, it could be argued that the Union does not seem to have the most 
consistent policy of conditionality. The internal divisions, the variation in terms of 
strictness over time, and the inconsistency of applying the ‘ICTY condition’ in 
different but comparable cases damage the EU’s credibility. If a condition is not 
credible and consistent, it offers scope for manipulation to the target government 
and gives the impression that conditionality is negotiable. We will see in the part on 
Serbia’s perspective, that this has indeed been the case and that the inconsistency 
of the EU has seriously damaged the effectiveness of ‘ICTY conditionality’. 
 
3. ‘ICTY Conditionality’ from the Serbian Point of View 
 
Conditionality is a two-way process, in which the target state determines as much of 
its effectiveness as the external partner who sets the condition. Serbia’s recent history 
of wars and ethnic conflicts still resonates into its current politics. The question of 
cooperation with the ICTY is therefore a very complex and sensitive one. Whether the 
Serbian government complies or not, there are always internal and external costs 
tied to its policy. By linking the issue of domestic costs to an overview of Serbia’s track 
record of cooperation with the ICTY, we will have a better understanding of Serbia’s 
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‘ICTY policy’. Another important factor to explain Serbia’s cooperation is the role of 
veto players. I will demonstrate that the ousting of Milošević was not followed by the 
necessary changes in Serbia’s state structures. By consequence, the foundations for 
a policy of full cooperation with the Tribunal were never laid.  
 
3.1 Political Costs 
As Schimmelfennig argued, “[i]n order to be effective, […] EU conditionality has to 
fall on fertile domestic ground”.66 Therefore, the domestic costs of compliance with 
‘ICTY conditionality’ for the Serbian government must be low in order for 
conditionality to be effective. In this section, I will assess the domestic costs of 
compliance and identify the strategies used by the different Serbian governments to 
keep them as low as possible. 
 
3.1.1 What Price for Cooperation with the ICTY? 
According to Epstein and Sedelmeier, the EU has difficulties in obtaining compliance 
from Serbia because the policy of conditionality implies high political costs on the 
domestic level.67 This is due to the fact that the demands of the Union in part touch 
upon the Serbian national identity. The question of extraditing suspected war 
criminals is very sensitive because most of the indictees – and especially Karadžić 
and Mladić – are still seen as national heroes by a large part of the Serbian society 
and political elite.68 Moreover, a majority of Serbs perceive the ICTY as a political 
instrument with an anti-Serbian bias. 69  Therefore, one of the major costs of 
cooperation with the ICTY for any Serbian government is that it goes against 
domestic public opinion. The Tribunal hurts the Serbian national pride and creates 
aversion towards the European Union and others who set such cooperation as a 
condition.70 However, both Vladimir Matic and Milanka Saponja-Hadžić find that in 
certain moments in the past, the Serbian public has accepted cooperation with the 
ICTY.71 Both the extradition of Milošević in 2001 and the hunt on war criminals after 
the murder of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in 2003 could count on public support. 
Nevertheless, support has not been a constant given, and often the only factor that 
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can help to overcome opposition vis-à-vis cooperation with the ICTY is external 
pressure. However, the risk of “alienating a substantial portion of the electorate” 
remains real.72 It is clear that public opinion functions as a brake for cooperation and 
erodes the efficiency of ‘ICTY conditionality’. 
 
Both the popularity of the indictees and the negative public opinion vis-à-vis the 
Tribunal are connected to the broader issue of nationalism. Cooperation with the 
ICTY and extradition of suspected war criminals have stirred up nationalism and 
undermined the popularity of moderate forces in Serbian politics.73 A large part of 
this is caused by the powerful right-wing nationalist media, which aim to create an 
“atmosphere that demonises reformers, promotes right-wing nationalism, and 
denigrates all who cooperate with The Hague”.74 While publications are less flagrant 
now than in the past, most media still feed nationalism and effectively undermine 
any basis for cooperation with the Tribunal.75 According to Vladimir Gligorov, this 
contributes to an ideological narrow-mindedness, and a political debate focused on 
nationalist ideas of the past. 76  Under such conditions, the political costs of 
advocating cooperation with the ICTY are very high. It becomes increasingly difficult 
to establish a pro ICTY-regime, since nationalist parties become more popular and 
are often needed to form a majority. Vojislav Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia 
(DSS), which can hardly be labeled pro-ICTY or pro-Europe, has led most govern-
ments since the fall of Milošević. I will discuss its role in more detail below. A second 
important player is the Socialist Party of Milošević, which was necessary to provide 
support in parliament for Koštunica’s minority government established in 2004. In 
order to retain the support of the Socialists, Koštunica reversed the government’s 
policy on cooperation with the ICTY and became far more reluctant in pushing for 
arrests and extraditions.77 The Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Šešelj – on trial in The 
Hague – also remained a very potent force up until 2008. The party, which has now 
split, has a pro-Moscow and strong anti-Hague profile. Its acting leader until 
September 2008 was Tomislav Nikolić, a nationalist radical who was a redoubtable 
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opponent for Boris Tadić during the 2008 presidential election. 78 The fact that 
nationalist parties still have a great weight in Serbian politics means that pro-ICTY 
parties have to compromise massively, and risk smear campaigns if they push for 
more cooperation. Moreover, most of the parties mentioned above do not see EU 
membership as a political priority, which is an additional factor undermining the 
effectiveness of the EU’s policy of conditionality.79 
 
3.1.2 Strategic Cooperation 
Throughout the years the Serbian authorities have always looked for ways to balance 
the external ‘costs of no cooperation’ with the internal costs of cooperation. This has 
produced a number of strategies. I will briefly outline the three most important ones 
as they give a better understanding of Serbia’s track record of cooperation with the 
ICTY.  
 
The first one is that of ‘minimum cooperation and appeasing’. Vojislav Koštunica – 
president from 2001 to 2004 and Prime Minister from 2004 to 2008 – was very reluctant 
to cooperate with the ICTY. Carla del Ponte writes that ‘ICTY cooperation’ never 
featured on top of his agenda and that his governments only delivered the absolute 
minimum of what was asked in order to appease the US and the EU.80 Reports from 
the US Congress and the Chief Prosecutor confirm this. From 2001 to 2003 coopera-
tion with the ICTY only increased when the US certification deadline for aid drew 
near. 81 Carla del Ponte’s addresses before the UN Security Council state that 
cooperation slowed down or often came to a standstill after the certification 
deadline and that Serbia never cooperated ‘fully’.82 Koštunica often reassured the 
West through the adoption of laws and action plans on cooperation. In April 2002, for 
instance, the Federal Parliament of Yugoslavia adopted a law on cooperation with 
the ICTY. “Koštunica […] claimed erroneously that cooperation could not proceed 
without this law.”83 While many in Europe and the US saw the adoption as a sign of 
Koštunica’s will to cooperate with the ICTY, the Tribunal itself branded the law as 
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flawed and unnecessary.84 “[T]he law stipulated that the government could only 
give approval for the arrest of suspects who were indicted by the tribunal before the 
law entered into force”.85 This effectively undermined the ongoing investigations 
which the Tribunal was carrying out in pending cases. A second example is the 
action plan Koštunica proposed to arrest Ratko Mladić when the EU had suspended 
negotiations on the SAA. According to Del Ponte, this plan was nothing but a 
smokescreen for a policy of non-cooperation, drafted with the aim to give the 
European member states something to resume the negotiations.86 One diplomat 
branded this strategy as “a policy of false promises and constant delay”.87 
 
A second tactic employed by Koštunica came to the fore in 2003. In the run-up to 
the December parliamentary elections, Koštunica had watered down his stance on 
ICTY cooperation even more. He was afraid the current policy would play into the 
hands of the Serbian Radical Party and adopted a policy of ‘voluntary surrender’: 
the Serbian government would no longer arrest suspected war criminals but 
negotiate with them and convince them to voluntarily surrender.88 When the Radical 
Party became the largest one in the Serbian parliament and Koštunica had to rely 
on the Socialist Party for a majority, this policy was reinforced and cooperation 
virtually came to a standstill. This led the Bush administration to suspend aid in 2004 
and 2005.89 Pressure subsequently mounted on Koštunica causing him to increase 
the incentives for the indictees to surrender voluntarily by promising money to their 
families and providing them with new cars.90 The US pressure and suspension of aid 
actually caused a significant change in cooperation as no less than 14 indictees 
were transferred. The transfers were presented to the Serbian public as ‘voluntary’, 
but “[a]s one observer notes, there were ‘voluntary surrenders’ where people 
showed up in their pyjamas and with duct tape”.91 
 
The last strategy I identified is the one used by the proponents of cooperation with 
the ICTY in Serbian politics. They too face the political costs discussed above. 
Remarkably enough they never frame ‘ICTY cooperation’ in a broader story of 
coming to terms with history and adhering to the underlying values such as respect 
for the rule of law. “Only a small minority of political figures has advanced the case 
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that Serbia should cooperate for moral rather than expedient reasons.”92 Indeed, 
even pro-European politicians such as the late Zoran Đinđić and Boris Tadić have 
always framed their position in a pragmatic way.93 They both used the external 
pressure from the US and the EU to justify their policy of cooperation. “[E]ven Serbian 
politicians who are supportive of the ICTY dare not contradict the Radicals’ anti-
Hague rhetoric with an alternative story lest they lose votes.”94 As argued before, this 
makes the promotion of norms and values which underpin a policy of cooperation 
with the Tribunal an extremely hard task for external actors. I will now briefly go into 
their influence on the domestic costs in Serbia, as they too have interfered indirectly 
into Serbian politics. 
 
3.2 Veto Players 
The capacity of compliance with conditionality is influenced by the number of veto 
players in the institutional structure of the target state. The more veto points, the more 
resistance there is to change.95 Moreover, as Tsebelis argued, the more significant 
the change of the status quo, the more difficult it is to overcome these veto points.96 
In the following sub-sections I will discuss the role of three of the most important veto 
players: Vojislav Koštunica, the army and the secret service. This analysis will also give 
a better idea of the scope of change necessary for a policy of ‘full cooperation’. 
 
3.2.1 Vojislav Koštunica 
Vojislav Koštunica is undoubtedly one of the most important veto players for ICTY 
cooperation since October 2000. He was president of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia from 2000 to 2003 and Prime Minister of Serbia from 2004 until 2008. His 
relationship with the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY was very uneasy. Del Ponte 
described him to the UN Security Council as a “man of the past”, “a manipulative 
politician who would do his utmost to avoid cooperation”.97 Fact is that Koštunica 
had and still has an anti-Hague stance. Pushing for full cooperation with the ICTY 
would be renouncing his nationalist power base.98 Moreover, he often used the 
argument that exerting great pressure on Serbia to cooperate with The Hague would 
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enforce the position of the ultra-nationalists, and that it would destabilise Serbia and 
the region.99 
  
Koštunica’s DSS has functioned as a brake for the reforms that were necessary in the 
Serbian government’s apparatus to guarantee full ICTY cooperation. “[H]e and his 
advisers consistently obstructed the […] coalition from purging the […] army [and the 
security service] of Milosevic supporters. The DSS also opposed efforts to reform the 
judiciary and […] actively obstructed cooperation with the ICTY.”100 According to 
Eric Gordy, the ‘soft and gradual’ transition Koštunica advocated, boiled down to a 
standstill.101 As long as significant elements of the state structures from the Milošević 
era were not purged instantly, they would continue to obstruct fundamental change 
in the Serbian society. Even after the murder of Đinđić, the ‘reformist zeal’ of the 
Serbian government was short-lived. The government announced that the army 
would be put under civilian control, that the security structures were being reformed 
and that all outstanding demands from the ICTY would be addressed within the 
year.102 However, the changes made in the army and the Serbian Civilian Security 
Agency (BIA) – two institutes which obstructed full cooperation with the Tribunal – 
remained very limited. As Eric Gordy writes, the Serbs “had succeeded in brigning 
about ‘October 5’ (the actual date on which Milošević was compelled to leave 
power in 2000), but […] ‘October 6’ (the imaginary date that symbolized the 
definitive break of Serbian political culture from the legacy of the Milošević period) 
never occurred”.103 
 
The explanation for Koštunica’s reluctance is two-fold. Firstly, he was elected on the 
basis of a nationalist agenda. Hence, the lack of political will to pursue reforms in 
order to establish full cooperation with the ICTY. It is now widely acknowledged that 
Koštunica played a part in the protection of Ratko Mladić up until 2005. He signed 
the approval for Mladić’s retirement and claimed he could do nothing to stop the 
army paying the general’s pension.104 Moreover, the Serbian Ambassador to Belgium 
admitted that Koštunica must have had detailed information on the whereabouts of 
Radovan Karadžić in 2008, but did not have the political will to arrest him.105 The 
second reason for Koštunica’s reluctance to fully cooperate with The Hague is that 
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pressure was not exerted consistently by the US and the EU. “The absence of pressure 
appears to have emboldened Koštunica’s defiance of the tribunal.”106 The many 
shortcomings in the policy of conditionality as discussed in the previous chapter were 
repeatedly exploited by Koštunica through a policy of minimum cooperation and 
constant promising.107 Nevertheless, Serbia’s Prime Minister was not the only veto 
player blocking full cooperation. Both the army and the secret service played a 
crucial role in obstructing reformist pressures and protecting the most wanted 
suspects on del Ponte’s list. 
 
3.2.2 The Army 
The army has long protected former army officials from the indictments of the ICTY. In 
her memoires, Carla del Ponte lists some of the evidence that shows the involvement 
of high-level military officials in the protection of Ratko Mladić. Up until 2002 the army 
still paid Mladić’s salary.108 There are indications that he received medical treatment 
in a Belgrade hospital in 2003 and travelled to several military training grounds in 
Serbia in that same year. Mladić also received a military pension until 2005.109 On 
several occasions del Ponte was told by Serbian officials that the arrest of Mladić was 
a case for the army and not for the civilian authorities.110 In response, General Krga 
of the Yugoslav Army contended that the army gave no refuge to indictees, and 
passed the buck on to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. However, after intelligence was 
presented to him by the office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, Krga admitted that 
Mladić had been in Serbia in 2003 and 2004, had received protection of members of 
his former staff and had enjoyed access to grounds and facilities of the army. 
Nevertheless, he maintained that this was a situation of the past and that Mladić 
received no more protection as of 2005.111 
 
As I have argued above, the political response to the obstruction of the army has 
been rather weak. In the period between October 2000 and March 2003 no 
significant reforms were carried out.112 Even the (short) reformist boost following the 
assassination of Đinđić has proven to be insufficient. It emerged, for instance, that 
new high-level appointees were also implicated in war crimes during the Kosovo war 
of 1999. In addition to that, the dissolution of the dubious Commission for 
                                                 
106 Peskin, op.cit., p. 64. 
107 Interview with diplomat A, op.cit. 
108 Del Ponte, op.cit., p. 157. 
109 Ibid., pp. 242, 247.  
110 Ibid., pp. 157, 245, 247. 
111 Ibid., pp. 246-248, 253. 
112 Gordy, op.cit., p. 14. 
  23 Mathias Dobbels 
Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal (CAC)– a military body responsible for 
cooperation with the ICTY – did not bring about the reforms the Tribunal thought 
were necessary to ensure full cooperation.113 Both Tadić and Koštunica maintained 
that the cooperation in the search for indictees between the civilian authorities and 
the army was excellent and that there were no signs that suspects such as Mladić 
were being protected by the army.114 Yet, according to reports from the Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade, the army is still withholding crucial 
documents from the Prosecutor’s office.115 Del Ponte, too, still believes Mladić is 
being protected by the army and contended that the Serbian government is not 
doing enough to arrest him.116 The key to overcome the veto position of the army 
thus seems to lie in the hands of the politicians. Once again, a lack of political will to 
purge the army from elements that protect suspects such as Mladić limits Serbia’s 
ability to cooperate with the ICTY and slows down the country’s progress of 
integrating with Europe. 
 
3.2.3 The Serbian Secret Service (BIA) 
An important domestic factor behind Serbia’s failure to comply with ‘ICTY 
conditionality’ is the veto position of the security services.117 Srđjan Cvijić calls a 
reform of the security services the top requirement for Serbia’s swift integration into 
the EU.118 After the ousting of Milošević the structures of the BIA were never purged 
from anti-ICTY elements. Đinđić had secured the resignation of the security chief 
Radomir Marković, a top ally of Milošević who was suspected of having a hand in 
several political murders.119 However, the changes at the top have not prevented 
the lower levels from keeping a firm grip on the BIA’s functioning and obstructing 
cooperation with the ICTY.120 According to the International Crisis Group, the BIA has 
significant information on war crimes committed during the Milošević era, but is not 
making it public to protect its own members. “Those compromised by such activities 
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have formed powerful parallel structures within the security organs that play a 
significant role in obstructing cooperation with the ICTY.”121 The Humanitarian Law 
Centre in Belgrade comes to the same conclusion, stating that “[i]t is obvious that 
parts of […] security agencies […] play a major role among those who protect the 
ICTY indictees”.122 
 
The assassination of Đinđić, in which BIA members were involved, was the wake-up 
call for the government to reform the security structures. Yet, the reformist action 
taken in the aftermath of the murder appears to have been a “one-off reaction” 
and “the BIA remains almost completely unreformed and free of public scrutiny or 
true parliamentary control”.123 Once again, the determining factor seems to be a 
lack of political will to reform the structures from the Milošević regime. The 
International Crisis Group points to the ties of the governing parties with the financial 
oligarchy of the 1990s. These dubious groups have a vested interest in keeping the 
security structures unreformed and are obstructing the necessary reforms Serbia 
needs for a policy of full cooperation with the ICTY.124 
 
Coming back to the hypothesis, it could be argued that cooperation with the ICTY 
requires a great change away from the status quo. Structures of important veto 
players such as the army and the security service need to be reformed because their 
direct or indirect involvement in the war crimes committed in the 1990s makes them 
into the main obstructing force for cooperation. Tough political action is needed to 
reform these institutions. However, my research has shown that the governing parties 
have often lacked political will to push for reforms and have not always been in 
favour of ICTY cooperation. Especially Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica has been a 
major brake on reforms and has never seen cooperation with the Tribunal as a 
priority for Serbia. The power of the veto players has indeed been a major factor in 
stalling Serbia’s progress on compliance with the conditionality set by the EU.  
 
3.2 Current Situation 
With Tadić elected president in February 2008 and the formation of a government 
led by the Democratic Party (DS) and without the Radical Nationalists or Koštunica’s 
DSS, the conditions for a pro-European course seem favourable. According to 
Vladimir Gligorov, Tadić’s victory and the formation of a pro-European government 
                                                 
121 International Crisis Group, op.cit., p. 14. 
122 Humanitarian Law Centre, Serbia’s Cooperation with ICTY, Belgrade, January 2007. 
123 International Crisis Group, op.cit., pp. i, 15. 
124 Ibid., p. 17. 
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in July 2008 meant the Serbian electorate has given a clear mandate to the 
government to move closer to Europe and fulfill the outstanding conditions. 125 
Moreover, the Radical Party split after the elections over their policy on integration 
with the EU.126 The political situation thus seems to be favourable at last to pursue a 
clear policy of cooperation with the ICTY. The arrest and extradition of Radovan 
Karadžić only a few weeks after the new government took office, sent a clear 
message to the EU about Serbia’s new policy of cooperation. Not only were the 
street protests minor, but according to Ambassador Diklić it became clear that the 
political will to cooperate fully with the Tribunal is finally there and that the Serbian 
authorities will do anything within their possibilities to extradite the remaining 
fugitives.127 Diklić also claimed there is a wind of change in the BIA with a newly 
appointed chief and that the army has been purged of officers who have ties with 
Ratko Mladić.128 
 
However, not all domestic conditions are right for an unbridled policy of cooperation 
with the Tribunal. The formation of the new government was a cumbersome process 
in which the Socialist Party of the late Milošević played the role of kingmaker.129 This 
not only poses questions in terms of the pro-Europeanness of the government (the SP 
has not exactly been an advocate of cooperation with the ICTY and more 
integration with the EU), but it also shows the ever present split in Serbian society. 
Although the Western media proclaimed the pro-European parties to be victorious in 
the 2008 parliamentary elections, Šešelj’s Radical Party and Koštunica’s DSS still 
managed to get more than 40% of the votes with an anti-European program. One 
might wonder what the Socialists asked in return for their support of a DS-led 
government? According to Ambassador Diklić, all Socialists in the government are 
pro-European and have made a firm commitment for a policy geared towards 
European integration.130 Yet, not everyone in the EU is at ease with the Socialist 
presence. “We wonder what the effect of a Socialist Minister of Interior Affairs will be 
on the issue of cooperation with the Tribunal”, said one diplomat.131 
 
So far the Chief Prosecutor’s reports have been positive since the new government 
took office. Whereas Serge Brammertz – who replaced Carla del Ponte in January 
                                                 
125 Gligorov, op.cit. 
126 Cvijic, op.cit., p. 2. 
127 Interview with Radomir Diklic Serbian Ambassador to Belgium, op.cit. 
128 Ibid. 
129 ‘Serbia: A Pro-EU Government in the Making’, Stratfor, 27 June 2008. 
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2008 – branded Serbia’s cooperation as insufficient in June 2008, his address to the 
Security Council of December was far more positive.132 He hailed the extradition of 
Karadžić as a milestone in Serbia’s cooperation and said that “[t]he changed 
general political environment has led to a more decisive and proactive approach to 
cooperation by authorities at the political, judicial and operational levels”.133 Yet 
Brammertz refrained from calling cooperation full: there are still problems with the 
protection of witnesses, important documents are missing and two indictees have 
yet to be apprehended, Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić.134 Moreover, Vladimir 
Gligorov questions whether there is a strong strategy on how to integrate more with 
the EU.135 With a pro-European mandate and the opposition weakened by splits, 
Gligorov rightly wonders what more is stopping the governing parties on carrying out 
the necessary reforms and complying with conditionality.136 The Serbian government 
is saying that change is happening, but that it takes time. Nevertheless, it is confident 
that it will soon get the label of ‘full cooperation’ from Prosecutor Brammertz – 
regardless of Mladić’s arrest – and will be able to proceed on its path to the EU.137 
Only time and future research will tell whether the new government has really 
brought about substantial change and manages to overcome the remaining 




The demand for cooperation with the ICTY is a relatively new form of conditionality 
employed by the EU vis-à-vis certain aspiring members. This paper asked to what 
extent the EU’s policy of ‘ICTY conditionality’ has been effective in the case of 
Serbia. Many authors agree that without external pressure, Serbia’s willingness and 
capacity to cooperate with the Tribunal would have been much lower.138 Every time 
extraditions were made or cooperation increased, this was due to a strict policy of 
conditionality by either the US or the EU. The most eye-catching results where 
undoubtedly the extradition of Milošević in 2001, the transfer of 14 indictees in 2005 
and the extradition of Karadžić in 2008. All three instances were linked to either the 
US threatening to suspend financial aid for Serbia or the EU threatening to suspend 
proceedings on the SAA. These events show that conditionality is most effective 
                                                 
132 S. Jennings, ‘Brammertz Slams Serbian Tribunal Cooperation’, Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting, 6 June 2008. 
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134 Ibid. 
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when compliance is tied to real benefits and immediate rewards. Yet, from the case 
study it also emerged that Serbia’s cooperation has not been consistently high. The 
theoretical framework provided the tools to identify those factors which influenced 
the effectiveness of the policy of conditionality throughout the years. 
 
First of all, up until 2005 the EU did not tie cooperation with the ICTY to any specific 
reward. It was the US government which had the biggest impact on Serbia’s policy 
of cooperation by making the certification of aid dependent on Serbia’s progress in 
cooperating with the Tribunal. The employment of ‘ICTY conditionality’ on the part of 
the EU must be seen in terms of the renewed attention for potential candidate 
members after the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004. Nevertheless, even after that 
date, the EU’s policy of ‘ICTY conditionality’ has not always been effective. A lack of 
consistency in the application of the condition is one of the major factors explaining 
this shortcoming. The EU has failed to apply ‘ICTY conditionality’ consistently over 
time and across cases. Cooperation with the ICTY did not feature on top of the EU’s 
agenda with Serbia until 2005. And even after that date, the EU has at times 
softened its stance on significantly. Either with the aim to boost pro-European forces 
during elections or with the objective of making Serbia more flexible on the issue of 
Kosovo. Moreover, the example of the Croatian accession talks show that the EU has 
not been consistent in applying ‘ICTY conditionality’ in different cases. The standards 
in the Croatian case appeared to be much lower than those in the Serbian case. 
The reason for these inconsistencies is two-fold. Firstly, the EU is not a monolithic actor. 
Its decisions on conditionality are made on the basis of political negotiations 
between the member states and not on a set of pre-described rules. Secondly, the 
policy of conditionality with regard to enlargement has changed over time. The 
premature accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, a feeling of ‘enlargement 
fatigue’ and concerns about the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ have triggered a much 
stricter policy of conditionality in which even technical steps – such as the signing of 
an agreement – are linked to certain conditions. 
 
The inconsistency with which the EU has applied its conditionality has left the door 
open for manipulation on part of the Serbian government and gave the impression 
that conditionality is something which is negotiable. I have showed that especially 
Prime Minister Koštunica has exploited these shortcomings by pursuing a policy of 
minimum cooperation. Nevertheless, conditionality is a two-way process and its 
effectiveness does not depend on the EU alone. There are important domestic 
factors to take into consideration when assessing ‘ICTY conditionality’. First of all, the 
precarious political situation in Serbia makes it difficult to push for full cooperation 
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with the Tribunal. Not only is the public’s opinion largely negative vis-à-vis the 
Tribunal, but war criminals are still seen as national heroes by a significant part of the 
Serbian society. Pushing for cooperation with the Tribunal thus entails significant 
political costs as it plays into the hands of nationalist forces. In addition to that, the 
section on veto players has shown that reforms in the army and security structures 
are necessary to ensure a stable basis for a policy of cooperation. I have 
demonstrated that it is partly due to a lack of political will to pursue these reforms 
that Serbia has failed to establish a consistent policy of cooperation.  
 
Finally, this case study has produced some useful observations on the renewed 
policy of conditionality that the EU is pursuing vis-à-vis potential or future members. It 
is clear that conditionality today is tougher than in past enlargement dossiers, but 
that the inconsistency with which it is applied is a major shortcoming. The divisions 
among the member states on how to promote change and reforms prevent the EU 
from having a strong and unified policy of conditionality. Moreover, this research has 
shown that ‘ICTY conditionality’ has not brought about the changes in values that 
the EU is aiming for. This is partly due to a lack of clarity on the EU’s side to link its 
policy of conditionality with the underlying values of democracy and respect for the 
rule of law. However, it is also due to the unwillingness of Serbian leaders to inform 
the Serbian public about the work of the Tribunal and about the importance that 
suspects are brought before a judge.  
 
The analysis has also taught us something about the changing dynamics of 
enlargement. The case of Serbia shows that the EU is less clear in putting forward a 
membership perspective and that eventual membership cannot be taken for 
granted. It also demonstrated that steps in the accession process which used to be 
relatively easy to reach are increasingly tied up to compliance with certain 
conditions. The signing and entry into force of the SAA or the granting of the 
candidate status have become significant ‘rewards’ for aspiring members. If this 
case study has shown one thing, it is that Serbia’s road to membership is still long and 
rocky. It is unclear what the future holds and how the EU will assess Serbia’s 
compliance with the ‘ICTY condition’. Nevertheless, the policy of conditionality will 
not stop once the issue of cooperation with the Tribunal is resolved. The question of 
Kosovo will surely be one of the next ‘big issues’ on the negotiation table between 
Serbia and the EU. It will be interesting to see how the findings of this paper apply in 
that particular case and how the EU’s policy of conditionality will evolve over time. 
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